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ABSTRACT:  This study examines the question of whether auditors should be allowed 
to perform tax services for clients that they also provide the audit.  The question was 
examined by looking at bankers’ perceptions of auditor independence, objectivity and 
reliability of the report on the financial statements when the auditor also performs tax 
compliance services for (1) the audit client and (2) company executives. We randomly 
selected bank loan officers from a commercial prepared list and mailed a questionnaire 
to each participant. Questionnaire results, based on 181 participants, indicate that bank 
loan officers believe attest auditors should be allowed to provide tax compliances 
services to the client even though they may be auditing some of their own work.  
Results also indicate that bank loan officers think that independence and objectivity 
would be impaired and reliability of the auditor’s report would not be enhanced if the 
auditor provides tax compliance services to the client and the client’s executives they 
also audit.  
 




Much debate has taken place concerning the issue of whether independence is 
impaired when the attest auditor also provides tax compliance services to public audit 
clients. However the SEC, PCAOB and the AICPA have all continued to allow attest 
auditors to provide tax services to their audit client. How did this debate get started- the 
auditors have been doing tax services for their attest clients for many years? Over time 
the auditing environment changed with new tax services and other services being 
added to the auditor’s list of fee paying services. These new services required new 
regulations to keep pace with the changing environment. It took enormous financial 
fraud scandals to get us to this point. This call for regulatory change produced the SOX 
(Hart, 2009). The act made several significant changes including creating the PCAOB, 
adding stringent internal control requirements, and strengthening the auditor 
independence rule. Furthermore, the SEC noted the possibility of auditor independence 
impairment from the provision of auditor-provided tax services and approved the rules of 




the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to further limit the provision of such 
service (SEC, 2006). 
 
Auditor provision of tax services and other non-audit service combined with an audit of 
the client continues to be an important question. It is well known that independence of 
external auditors is important to investors (Robinson, 2008).  One report stated that 
credible financial reports are vital to confidence in the capital markets (Van Der Plaats, 
2000). Investors need to believe what they are told about the investee companies by the 
auditor, as such auditor independence is a key source that gives the auditor’s work its 
value. Because Independence gives the auditor’s work value, it is the core of the 
profession (SEC, 2000). “For investors to have confidence in the quality of the audit, the 
public must perceive the accountant as independent” (SEC, 2000). The concern is 
important enough that the PCAOB and SEC stated that they will hold a round-table 
discussion to address the issue of audit firms providing non-audit and consulting 
services to audit clients (Tysiac, 2013).  Since regulators in the nonpublic environment 
continue to allow attest auditors to provide tax service to their audit clients, this paper 
provides some empirical information to help regulators evaluate if changes are needed 
with respect to non-audit services in a nonpublic environment. The remainder of this 
article includes the following sections: (1) A review of the professional literature on 
NASs, (2) Research questions, (3) Methodology, (4) Findings, (5) Summary, (6) 
Recommendations and (7) Conclusions. 
 
II. Non-audit Services-The Professional Literature 
For public companies, the guiding principles for auditor provided tax services to audit 
clients come from the Public Company Accounting Reform and investor Protection Act 
of 2002. This act states that an auditor who performs non-audit services to audit clients 
must not (1) Act in the role of management, (2) Audit its own work, (3) Act as an 
advocate of the client (U.S. Senate, 2002). In addition, section 202 of SOX requires that 
non-audited services including tax services be approved by the audit committee and 
disclosed in the annual report of the public company (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2002). The GAO states that when performing non-audit services for an audit client, the 
auditor must (a) consider the auditor’s ability to perform an audit without being affected 
by influences that compromise professional judgment, (b) exposure of the auditor or 
audit organization to circumstances that would cause a reasonable and informed third 
party to conclude that the integrity, objectivity, or professional skepticism of the audit 
organization, or a member of the audit team, had been compromised (U.S. Congress, 
2011).  
 
The fact that Public Company firms are reducing the amount of fees paid to their audit 
clients for tax services indicates a concern for auditor independence real or perceived 
(Lassila, et al, 2010). Still another study investigating Tax Avoidance states that clients 
purchasing tax services from their audit firm engage in greater tax avoidance when their 
external audit firm is a tax expert (McGuire, Omer, Wang, 2012). However, the 
important finding in this study that supports our motivation is the statement that “While 
prior research suggest that the use of auditor-provided tax services declined after the 




passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Krishnan, Visvanathan and Yu, 2013) find that 
approximately two-thirds of the corporation in their sample continue to purchase at least 
a portion of their tax consulting and compliance services from their external audit firm 
(McGuire, Omer, Wang, 2012).  
 
Another reason that firms are decoupling their tax services for audit service is the fact 
that although the SEC permits the auditor to provide tax services there are some 
significant restrictions like having to disclose fees paid for tax services separately in the 
company’s annual proxy statements (Lassila, et al, 2010). A study conducted by 
Seetharaman, Sun and Wang (2011) supports the decline in auditors providing tax 
services to their clients. The study found that for companies that purchased non-audited 
tax service from their auditors for the period 2003 to 2006, average tax fees declined by 
23% whereas average audit fees increased by 113%. Additionally, a study to test the 
relationship between auditor-provided tax fees and audits fees concluded, “Tests on the 
cross-selling of services show that firms that employ their incumbent auditors also for 
tax service are likely to pay higher audit fees than in the case when they only employ 
their auditors for audit service. Similarly, firms that do not use tax service of auditors are 
likely to pay lower audit fees than in the case had they had used incumbent auditors’ tax 
service” (Halperin, R., & Lai, K., 2015). Again these studies support the need for 
additional studies on auditor provided tax services because audit firms are continuing to 
provide these services to their clients. At the same time, these firms are recognizing that 
stakeholders may perceive them as not being independent when they couple the two 
services together. 
 
Because of these stated studies and the importance of auditor independence, this study 
provides much needed empirical research that can help firms, regulators, and 
stakeholders to make better decisions concerning auditors provided tax service. The 
AICPA’s position is that the auditor should follow the codified rules of 101-3 (AICPA, 
2014) in the performance of all non-audit functions. These rules require the auditor to 
acquire the proper approvals, not act in the role of management, and not take 
possession of entity assets. However, the GAO general standards state that non-audit 
services may create several threats to audit independence. These threats include self-
review threat and management participation threat. Both threats are examined in this 
article (U.S Congress, 2007).  
 
III. Research Question 
 
Recurring tax services are the only NAS negatively associated with restatements. One 
study stated that the negative association is consistent with recurring tax services 
providing auditors with knowledge spillovers that improve audit quality (Peterson and 
Valencia, 2011). Another study concluded that auditor provided tax services have an 
insignificant impact on audit quality (Krauss, Zulch, 2013). However, a GAO study 
concluded that accounting restatements increased 145 percent and cost investors $100 
billion during 1997-2000, and that restatements continued to increase from 2002 to 
2005 (U.S. Congress, 2002,2006). These studies show that more information is needed 
to continue addressing issues that may contribute to these misstatements.   




Significant controversy remains regarding the auditor providing tax services. 
Furthermore, major differences exist between SEC and AICPA independence rules 
regarding the independent auditors (1) providing tax services to their audited clients and 
(2) providing tax services to executives of their audit clients. Should the independent 
auditor be allowed to provide these additional services? Should auditors of nonpublic 
entities be afforded the flexibility to provide services which are limited and must be 
provided under more stringent circumstances in the public environment? We investigate 
these issues for users for financial statements in the nonpublic company context. We 
also include the related concepts of auditor objectivity and perceptions of financial 
statement reliability.  
 
Our research questions are (1) should auditors be allowed to provide tax services to 
their non- public audit clients, (2) should auditors be allowed to provide tax service to 




To obtain the necessary information required for this study, bank loan officers were 
used as the participants. The researcher chose bank loan officers as participants in the 
survey because they are sophisticated users of financial statements. Bank loan officers 
deal with all types of corporations, public and nonpublic, as well as have similar 
backgrounds and financial knowledge.  However, to obtain a fair homogeneous group of 
loan officers, a commercial prepared list was purchased from a commercially prepared 
mailing list. To obtain information about the prior experience of the bank loan officers, 
the questionnaire included a demographic section. The researcher performed a random 
selection of 1,500 bank loan officers then mailed a questionnaire to each of them. To 
evaluate the two research questions, we look at what the regulators say is a problem 
with auditors providing their tax services to their non-public audit clients. The main 
problems of the regulators, state that the auditing firm: (1) should not audit its own work; 
(2) should not function as part of client management or as a client employee; and (3) 
should not act as an advocate for the audit client (U.S. Senate, 2002). Each question 
was designed to solicit the Bank Loan Officer’s opinion about Independence, 
Objectivity, or Reliability. Some of the questions were directly related to the 
requirements of regulators for auditor independence. For example, the first question 
asked the Bank Loan Officer to agree or disagree with the statement that CPA firms are 
acting in an advocacy role for the audited entity when they also do tax compliance work 
for the audited entity. The second question asked if auditors provide tax compliance 
work for the audited entity, will auditor independence be impaired. For example, KPMG 
provided loaned staff to audit clients for certain tax services, to which the SEC stated 
that these services were management functions and impaired auditor independence. 
Furthermore, the SEC further stated that Management functions included acting, 
temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer or employee of an audit client, or 
performing any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function for the 
audit client. (SEC, 2014). “The independence of CPAs is the hallmark of the profession. 
As such, accountants put forth significant focus and effort to comply with the 
independence requirements related to everything from investments to business and 




employment relationships to services delivered to clients.” (Beckett, 2013). On the other 
hand, a study conducted by Krishnan, Visvanathan and Yu states that investors feel that 
the benefits of auditor-provided tax services outweigh the risks that the audit will not be 
performed independently enough. (Krishnan, Visvanathan, Yu, 2013).  
 
There are ten independence questions, two objective questions, five reliability questions 
and three questions dealing with auditors performing tax services for executives of the 
audit client. Respondents were instructed to circle their level of agreement on a 5-point 
Likert scale. The scale ranged from -2 to +2 with -2 indicating “strong disagreement” 
and +2 indicating “strong agreement”. The research used a mean response score to 
analyze each of the questions. Various statistical methods were used to analyze the 
information received from the questionnaire. 
 
The participants of the study are very sophisticated and knowledgeable. A large majority 
of the respondents were CEO/President of their organizations (68%). Over 95% of 
respondents were somewhat or very knowledgeable of the auditing process. In addition, 
over 90% of the respondents have 10 or more years of experience in medium size 
lending institutions (less than $1 Billion). Most of the respondents were male, over the 
age of forty, and held at least a bachelor’s degree.      
 
Table 1.  Demographics of Respondents of the Questionnaire 
 
 Count Percent 
Group Size 200 100.0% 
   
Title of Current Positions   
     CEO/President 134 68.0% 
     Vice President 35 17.8% 
     Loan Officer 11 5.6% 
     Credit Analyst 2 1.0% 
     Other 15 7.6% 
 197 100.0% 
Knowledge of Auditing   
     Not Knowledgeable 10 5.1% 
     Somewhat Knowledgeable 109 55.6% 
     Knowledgeable 63 32.1% 
     Very Knowledgeable 14 7.2% 
 196 100.0% 
   
Lending Experience   
     Less than 1 year 2 1.0% 
     1-5 years 5 2.5% 
     Over 5 years but less than 10 years 12 6.1% 
     10 years or more 178 90.4% 
 197 100.0% 
Company Size   
     Less than $1 Billion 167 85.2% 
     $1 Billion but less than $50 Billion 16 8.2% 
     $50 Billion but less than $100 Billion 4 2.0% 
Over $100 Billion 9 4.6% 




 196 100.0% 
Gender   
     Male 169 84.5% 
     Female 31 15.5% 
 200 100.0% 
Age   
     Less than 25 0 0.0% 
     25-40 14 7.1% 
     41-55 92 46.7% 
     Over 55 91 46.2% 
 197 100.0% 
Highest Education Attained   
     High School Diploma   10 5.1% 
     Associate’s Degree 14 7.1% 
     Bachelor’s Degree 120 60.9% 
     Master’s Degree 33 16.8% 
     Doctorate’s Degree 3 1.5% 
     Other 17 8.6% 
 197 100.0% 
  *For various reasons some respondents did not complete some of the demographic questions, causing the results 
to be different. 
 
V. Questionnaire Findings 
   
Table 2 shows the responses to the 20 items in the questionnaire. Responses 1 and 2 
were collectively referred to as “disagree” and “neutral” respectively while 3 was 
collectively referred to as “agree.” The analysis of the results uses the percentage of 
participants who disagree (1) and those who agree (3) with the statement to explain the 
responses. Certain statements in the questionnaire addressed each of the situations 
outlined by the SEC. 
 
The results of the questions in Table 2 can be summarized by four categories. The four 
categories are Independence, Objectivity, Reliability and General. Participants 
responded to several questions directly related to auditor independence (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 
and 12). To evaluate these four categories, we use the four determining factors that 




A 39% of the participants agreed that permitting the auditor to perform tax compliance 
work for an audited entity impairs auditor independence (2). When asked if doing 
compliance work for the entity that they audit would constitute acting in the role of 
management, only 25% agreed (3). When asked if auditors were acting in an advocacy 
role when they do tax compliance work for audited clients, 54% agreed (1). The 
response was 50% agreement with the question that CPA firms are auditing their own 
work when they also do tax compliance work for the audited entity (7). With respect to 
the standard of conflict of interest, only 29% of the participants thought there was a 
conflict of interest when the auditor provided tax advice to the entities that they audited 
(13). The last independence question asks if auditor independence was impaired by 




representing an attest client in an open court proceeding. 53% of the participants 
agreed with the auditor representing an attest clients in an open court proceeding (12). 
In sum, the participants were very much concerned that auditor independence could be 




Objectivity deals with biases and independence in appearance. There were two 
questions which asked specific Objective questions. Frist, the statement was made that 
permitting the auditor to perform tax compliance work for an audited entity impairs 
auditor objectivity. A significant number, 38%, of the participants agreed with this 
statement (9).  Second, the statement was made that permitting attest auditors to 
provide tax advice to entities that they audit impairs auditor objectivity. This time a 
slightly lower percentage, 36%, of the participants agreed with the statement (4). 
Although most of the participants do not think that the auditor’s objectivity is impaired 
when they perform tax compliance work for the client, there is still a significant number 




It is a consensus that if independence is impaired, reliability of the auditor’s report will 
be questioned.  Since this is a very important issue, five questions addressed the issue 
of Reliability. First, the question was asked if reliability on the auditor’s opinion was 
enhanced when the auditor only provides the audit and the client provides the tax 
service with internal staff. 45% of the participants agreed with this statement while only 
27% disagreed with the statement (16). When asked if reliability on the auditor’s opinion 
was enhanced when the auditor provides the audit and tax services for the client, only 
30% of the participant agreed with the statement (17). However, when the participants 
were asked if providing the audit and tax services for executives of the client enhanced 
the reliability of the auditor’s report, 50% of the participants disagreed (18). When the 
question was asked about the auditor providing the audit, tax services for the client and 
tax services for the executives of the client enhancing the reliability of the auditor’s 
report, 55% of the participants disagreed (19). Finally, 34% of the participants agreed 
that reliability on auditor’s opinion on the financial statements was impaired when the 
attest auditor provides tax compliance and audit services to the same client (20). In 
summary. the consensus of the participants indicates that reliability is affected when the 
attest auditor provides various tax services to the client and the participants are even 
more positive that reliability is not enhanced when attest auditors provide these attest 




Five General statements were made concerns auditors providing tax service to attest 
clients. First, the statement was made that CPA firms should be allowed to perform tax 
compliance work for entities that they audit (6). 57% of the participant agreed with this 
statement. The second statement said that attest auditors should be allowed to 




represent an audit client in an administrative proceeding before a taxing authority. 
Again, 66% of the participants agreed with the statement (10). The participants also had 
a similar response to attest auditors representing clients in tax court (11). Over 61% of 
the participants thought that attest auditors should be allowed to represent an audit 
client in tax court. When tax services for executives of the clients was added to the audit 
and/or tax services to the client, over 40% of the participants disagreed with this 
combination (14, 15). Finally, 53% of the participants disagreed with the statement that 
CPA firms create a conflict of interest when they provide tax advice to entities that they 
audit (13). Overall, a majority of the participants indicated that attest auditors should not 
provide these tax services to their clients. 
 
Table 2. Bank Loan Officers’ Opinions of Certain Issues Concerning 
















   (1) (2) (3)  
       
1. CPA firms are acting in an 
advocacy role for the audited 
entity when they also do tax 
compliance work for the 
audited entity. 
.50 1.12 19.9 26.5 53.6 100 
2. Permitting the auditor to 
perform tax compliance work 
for an audited entity impairs 
auditor independence. 
-.13 1.07 43.5 17.1 39.4 100 
3. When CPA firms do tax 
compliance work for the 
entities they audit, they are 
acting in the role of 
management for the entities. 
-.53 1.19 56.6 18.7 24.7 100 
4. Permitting the auditor to 
perform tax compliance work 
for an audited entity impairs 
auditor objectivity. 
-.16 1.27 45.2 19.3 35.5 100 
5. Permitting attest auditors to 
provide tax advice to entities 
that they audit impairs auditor 
independence. 
.00 1.26 39.5 17.4 43.1 100 
6. CPA firms should be allowed 
to perform tax compliance 
work for entities that they 
audit. 
.42 1.22 26.0 16.8 57.2 100 
7. CPA firms are auditing their 
own work when they also do 
.30 1.19 27.4 22.9 49.7 100 




tax compliance work for the 
audited entity. 
8. Permitting the auditor to 
perform tax compliance work 
for an entity and also perform 
tax compliance work for 
executives of that entity 
impairs auditor 
independence. 
.32 1.28 32.0 18.3 49.7 100 
9. Permitting attest auditors to 
provide tax advice to entities 
that they audit impairs auditor 
objectivity. 
-.04 1.14 37.1 25.3 37.6 100 
10. The attest auditor should be 
allowed to represent an audit 
client in an administrative 
proceeding before a taxing 
authority. 
.58 1.17 15.2 18.8   66.0 100 
11. The attest auditor should be 
allowed to represent an audit 
client in tax court. 
.47 1.09 21.9 16.4 61.7 100 
12. Auditor independence is 
impaired by representing an 
attest client in an open court 
proceeding. 
-.28 1.14 45.9 29.1 25.0 100 
13. CPA firms create a conflict of 
interest when they provide 
tax advice to entities that they 
audit. 
-.36    1.24  52.8 17.8   29.4 100 
14. CPA firms should be allowed 
to perform tax compliance 
work for executives of entities 
that they audit.  
-.07 1.24  39.6 23.3 37.1 100 
15. CPA firms should be allowed 
to perform tax compliance 
work for entities that they 
audit and also perform tax 
compliance work for 
executives of the entities that 
they audit. 
-.16 1.23 44.4 19.9 35.7 100 
 
16. Reliability on the auditor’s 
opinion is enhanced when the 
auditor only provides the 
audit and the client provides 










  44.6 
 
100 





17. Reliability on the auditor’s 
opinion is enhanced when the 
auditor provides the audit and 
tax services for the client. 
-.11 1.01 36.2 34.2 29.6 100 
18. When the auditor provides 
the audit and tax services for 
the executives of the client, 
reliability on the auditor’s 
opinion on the financial 
statements is enhanced. 
-.48 .98 49.7 33.9 16.4 100 
19. When the auditor provides 
the audit, tax services for the 
client, and tax services for the 
executives of the client, 
reliability on the auditor’s 
opinion on the financial 
statements is enhanced. 
-.63 .98 55.4 33.3 11.3 100 
20. When the attest auditor 
provides tax compliance and 
audit services to the same 
client, reliability on the 
auditor’s opinion on the 
financial statements is 
impaired. 
-.02 1.10 35.2 31.1 33.7 100 
*The measurement is a five-point scale ranging from –2 (SD) to 2 (SA). SD = Strongly Disagree;  D = Disagree;                                          
N = Neither Agree or Disagree; A = Agree;  SA = Strongly Agree. 
 
 
VI. Summary of Questionnaire Results 
 
Results of the questionnaire indicated that the bank loan officers thought that the attest 
auditor should be allowed to provide tax compliances services to the client even though 
they maybe auditing their own work. These participants indicated that providing tax 
compliance services to attest clients does not amount to acting in the role of 
management for the entities. Additionally, the participants also indicated that 
independence and objectivity would be impaired and reliability would not be enhanced 
when the attest auditor provides tax compliance services to the client, and tax 
compliance services to the executives of the client and the audit. However, most of the 
participants indicated that the attest auditor should be allowed to provide tax compliance 
services to the attest clients. 
 
Although some conclusions suggest by the results of the questionnaire, that there is still 
a significant difference of opinion amount between the participants, a one-way ANOVA 
and the Kruskal-Wallis test were conducted for each group of participants and the 
results, Table 3, indicate a significant difference between the groups. For 




Independence, the results for all questions, except the results of the ANOVA test for 
question 12, indicate a significant difference between the groups. The results for 
Objectivity showed a significant difference between the groups for both questions. 
These results were repeated for Reliability except for questions 17 and 18. However, 
the final General category shows a significant difference between the groups with the 
lone exception of the ANOVA results for question 11. 
Table 3. ANOVA and KRUSKAL-WALLIS  
Test Results for  Auditor Independence, Objectivity, and Reliability and General 
 
                                                                      Knowledge                                                                     
 
                                     ANOVA          KRUSKAL-WALLIS       
Independence 
 
Questions  #                 .Sig                             Asymp. Sig. 
 
1.                             .144                             .079 
2.                             .115                             .119 
3.                             .074                             .068 
5                                .003                             .003 
7.                               .056                             .035 
8.                               .097                             .069 




       4.                             .041                             .045 




       16.                           .442                             .434 
       17.                           .566                             .556 
       18.                           .633                             .501 
       19.                           .247                             .277 




         6.                           .153                             .208 
        10.                          .382                             .468 
        11.                          .411                             .518 
        13.                          .234                             .298 
        14.                          .413                             .410 
        15                           .083                             .072  
 






First, more research is needed on this subject in a nonpublic environment with future 
results examining other stakeholders besides bankers, such as government regulators 
and private regulators and practitioners. Secondly, just as the PCAOB and SEC are 
planning to review their current regulation, the AICPA and GAO need to also revisit their 
current regulations. It is suggested by this study and other similar studies that current 
regulations are not achieving the goals that they are designed to achieve. More 
empirical studies like this one are needed to help these regulators to determine the 
relationship, if any, of auditors providing tax services to their audit clients and 
independence. Studies involving all the stakeholders; investors, regulators and lenders 





Bankers are uncertain about the implications of the provision of tax services to audit 
clients have on independence, objectivity and reliability. However, bankers feel that 
auditors should be able to provide tax services to clients that they also provide the audit. 
Bankers do not think that auditors should provide tax services to executives of clients to 
whom audit services are also provided. Additionally, bankers perceive that reliability is 
not affected by the provision of tax services to audit clients. Moreover, regulators are 
undecided regarding the affects of tax service to audit clients and executives of audit 
clients on independence, objectivity and reliability. Based on the uncertainty of the 
bankers in this study and the decision of the public company regulators, the regulators 
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